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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for a division and partition of ·the 
interest in the family home involved in divorce decree en-
tered by the Court on March 14, 1949. 
DISPOSmON IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant made a Motion to the Court in November 
of 1965 to have the property in question sold and the ~ 
ceecls to be awarded first to the defendant for ·the value of 
his separate labors and expenses put in the property since 
t:he Decree of Divorce was entered, and to order the remain-
der of the proceeds to be divided equally between the plain-
tiff and the defendant. The Court denied defendant's 
motion in a minute entry of the Court, dated December 27, 
1965, but no order wa,s issued by the Court denying such. 
In April of 1966, the defendant petitioned the Court to di-
vide and partition the interest in the family home. 'Dhe 
plaintiff at this time also petitioned the Court to award 
the family home of the parties to the plaintiff. The Court, 
on the 13th day of October, 1966, issued an order denying 
all motions and petitions filed by either of the parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a decision setting aside the order 
of the 13th day of October, 1966, and the minute entry of 
December 27, 1965, made by the trial court, and to have 
the case remanded to the lower court with instructions to 
divide and partition the interest in the family home . 
STATMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and the defendant were married in 1939, 
and on March 14, 1949, the Court entered an Interlocutory 
Decree of Divorce between the parties and in favor of the 
plaintiff. Within two weeks after this Decree of Divorce 
was entered by the Court, the parties resumed a marital re-
lationship and continued this relationship for a period of 
over 14 years, and another child was born to the parties 
on April 16, 1951, as a result of this reconciliation. 
The 1949 Decree provided that the plaintiff was en-
titled to the use and occupancy of the house and lot in which ·.. -
the plaintiff and defendant and their children had been 
residing, and that the plaintiff was not to sell said place 
without the consent of the Court and the agreement of the 
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plaintiff and defendant. This was done in order that the 
Court might make a fair and equitable distribution of the 
proc£eds. The purpose of said decree and the agreement 
or the parties at that time was to grant the posression and 
use of the home for the rearing ad upbringing of the minor 
children, but the plaintiff was not granted fee simple title 
to the property. The proceeds of the property were to be 
later divided between the parties after the use of the home 
was no longer necessary for the rearing of the children. 
On the 14th of March, 1949, the said home was an inade-
quate two~room home in a very poor condition. After the 
decree was entered, the defendant herein, Ercil V. Carter, 
spent a substantial amount of money and extensive time on 
his own after work and on weekends in reconstructing his 
house and making it a suitable residence, which more than 
doubled the value of the home. He completely remodeled. 
the front two rooms of the house by putting in new floor-
ing, replastering and rewiring the whole house, and added 
a sizeable twelve-foot by forty-foot extension to the rear 
as well as building a garage beside the home and installing 
a furnace. The value of these modifications are in excess 
of the sum of $4,000.00. This reconstruction of the home 
was done at the expense of the defendant and by his own 
labor without any contribution of the plaintiff, and was 
done without legal oblia:tion or direction from the Court 
and was not intended as a gratuity to the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff, Wanda Carter Penrod, remarried. and 
moved from the premises, and the home was rented. The 
family existing between the parties to this action have 
matured and no longer need the residence for a home. The 
property was appraised on the 31st of March, 1965, for the 
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sum of $8,550.00, and the present fair market value of the 
property remains at about rthe same. 
Based on the above, the defendant petitioned the Court 
to divide and partition the interest in the family home or 
to sell the home and award the proceeds first to the de-
fendant for the value of his separate la:bors and exp~nses 
put in the property, and to order the remainder of the 
proceeds to be divided equally between 1the plaintiff and 
the defendant. The plaintiff petitioned the Court to award 
her the home in fee simple. At the Argument of these 
Motions, the parties stipulated the essential facts of the 
case which were the same as have b€en set out above. The 
COurt made its ruling with full knowledge of such facts. 
In its ruling, the Court denied all motions and petitions, 
thereby leaving the parties in the status quo and not di-
viding the property, which was held jointly according to 
the 1949. decree. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING AND 
NCYr GIVING MERIT TO THE DEFENDANT'S PETI-
TION TO DIVIDE AND PARTITION THE INTEREST 
IN THE FAMILY HOME. 
The purpose of a petition to divide and partition an in-
terest in real property is to determine who is entitled to 
what. The defendant's petition was filed with the Court 
for the purpose of determining his share or interest in the 
family home which the plaintiff had been awarded the use 
aild occupancy of as a home for herself and the minor chil-
dren, who were the issue of the marriage of the plaintiff and 
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defendant, under the divorce decree of 1949. Plaintiff, be-
lieving that she was entitled to the family home free and 
clear of any intere~st of the defendant, petitioned the Court 
io award the family home to her. By denying both of 
the~e petitions, the Court left the parties in the status quo, 
wiih neither having a dear title or knowing what his par-
ticular interest therein constituted. The defendant con-
tends, on appeal, that his peUtion was meritorious in light 
of the affidavit which was attached to it when filed, the 
facts as stipulated to and the wording and intent of the 
1949 Divorce Decree. It is stated in Paragraph 4 of the 
Cecree issued in 1949, that 
"The plaintiff is hereby awarded the house and lot in 
which she now resides and in which plaintiff and de-
fendant and their children have been residing for the 
use and occupancy of said plaintiff and said minor 
children, said plaintiff not to sell said place without 
the consent of this Court and agreement of plaintiff 
and defendant. It is further ordered that the defendant 
maintain the payments due and to become due on the 
debt on said place, amounting to $31.90 per month until 
said debt is paid in full . . . . Defendant is fur-
ther ordered to pay all taxes due or which will here-
after become due on said place at the time said taxes 
become due and payable." 
Under Paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact of the 1949 
Decree, it is stated: 
"That plaintiff and defendant own a house west of 
Provo City in Utah County, State of Uath, where there 
is a debt and obligation against said place in approxi-
mately the amount of $600.00 .and which is being dis-
charged at the rate of $31.94 per month. And it is 
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necessary for the plaintiff to have the cixupancy and 
use of said lot and house and the furniture and furnish-
ings therein as a home for herself and her minor chil-
dren, i,ssue of the marriage of the plaintiff and the 
defendant." 
Under Paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law in said 
Decree, it is further stated: 
"That plaintiff be awarded exclusive use and occupancy 
of the house and lot owned by the plaintiff and defend-
ant as a home for herself and said minor children, to 
gether with all furniture and furnishings now in said 
house, and that defendant be required to pay all taxes 
a~ thereon or which hereafter will be assessed 
thereon and to pay the same when they shall become 
due and payable." 
Air. can be seen from the above, the defendant retained 
an interest in the home according to the Decree, and the 
plaintiff was merely awarded the home for her use and 
occupancy as a home for herself and the minor children, 
which were the issue of the plaintiff and defendant. Fur-
ther evidence of this was the fact that the defendant was 
required to pay tlhe taxes that had accrued and that were 
to accrue. in the future on said home, and that he was to 
make the monthly payments on the home which were still 
outstanding. 
The fact that the Court retained jurisdiction over the 
property, and would not allow the plaintiff to sell it with-
out the Court's consent clearly indicates that the house 
was not granted to the plaintiff in fee simple. In the De-
cree of Divorce it state3 that the plaintiff cannot sell the 
house without the consent of the Court and consent of the 
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plaintiff and defendant. This, in itself, indicates that the 
Comt wan1:€d to retain jurisdiction over the property in 
order that the proceeds of tJhe property could later be di-
vided between the parties after the use of the home was no 
longer necessary for the rearing of the children. 
In the defendant's affidavit, submitted with his petitjOl) 
to divide and partition the interest in the family hQme, b~ 
states that the purpose of the DecNe a,nd tne a.g~ 
of the parties at the time of the issuance of the l)ivQrCe 
Decree was to grant the ~on and use of the home 
for the rearing and the upbringing of the minor childrep., 
but the plaintiff was n<;>t granted fee ~imple title to the 
property . The proc."'e€ds of the property were tQ be later 
divided between the parties after tJhe use of the h~ was 
no longer necessary for the rearing of 1Jhe children. It is 
further stated in said affidavit that the plaintiff, Wanda 
Carter Penrod, has remarried and moved from the prem-
i~, and the family existing between the parties to the 
action have matured and no longer need the ~dence for 
a home. 
In light of the above stated facts, it seems that the de-_ 
fendant's petition to divide and partition the interest in tine 
family home was meritorious, timely, and well-fowided; 
and therefore, the trial court erred. in denying such ~­
tion. 
As further evidence of the court's error it also <leni~ 
the plaintiff's petition to award the house to the plaintiff 
tn fee simple, thereby leaving both parties in the sta~ q\J.Q. 
Nothing was accomplished by either party in presen~ 
their cause before the Court. Defendant contend$ 9n 3-P-
peal that the court should have made a decision at that 
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time as to the particular OIWilership in the property in ques-
tion and how such ownership should be divided. 
POINT II 
THE PETITION FILED BY THE DEFENDANT 
WAS REASONABLE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UT AH, THEREBY WAR-
RANTING A FAVORABLE RULING BY THE COURT. 
In his petition, the defendant asked (1) that the plain-
tiff, Wanda Carter, a.k.a. Wanda Carter Penrod, be ad-
judged to have an equity of 1/3 of the fair market value 
of the property at the date of the Decree of Divorce from 
the defendant on March 14, 1949, said amount to be 1/3 
of $4,500.00 or the sum of $1,500.00; (2) that he (the de-
fendant) receive an equity of 2/3 of the fair market value 
of the property on the date of the divorce, or the sum of 
$3,000.00, and that he be adjudged to have a furtheT equity 
in the property for the reasonable value orf his services and 
improvements to the property since the date of the Decree 
of Divorce in the sum of $4,000.00; (3) that the plaintiff 
be required to account to the court for the rental moneys 
which she had received from the rent orf the property since 
its use as a family home by herself was terminated, and 
that the said rental moneys be allocated to the parties in 
accordance with their equities and interest in the said 
property; and (4) that he be permitted by the court to 
purchase all of the equities and interest of the plaintiff in 
accord with their present fair market value as appraised; 
or, in the alternative, that the court order the sale orf said 
property and division of proceeds in accordance with the 
inte1·est of each. 
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In light of the Utah Law cited hereinafter, it seems 
that this petition filed by the defendant was not unreason-
able and that the property rights of the plaintiff in this 
action shouid be terminated as of the date of the decree. 
After the 14th day of March, 1949, the plaintiff is not en-
t;i tied to any increment in value of the. proyerty resulting 
from the expenses and labor of the defendant; and since 
the defendant has materially increased the value of this 
property, he is entitled to all orf his contribution which was 
not provided under the marriage covenant. It would seem 
inequitable for the plaintiff to share a claim in the defend-
ant's labors after the plaintiff clailns that she has terml .. 
nated her relationship with 1him. 
In Wo,oley v. Wooley, 113 Utah 391, 195 P2d 743, the 
Court awarded the divorce to the defendant husband an the 
grounds of mental cruelty. Under the facts of this ca:;e, 
neither party had property when they married, but they 
worked harmoniously towards financial security and ac-
cumulated a substantial estate before the divorce. The 
Court ordered. the distribution as follows: The plaintiff wife 
received $19,000.00 from the sale of the family home where 
the remainder $11,000.00 went to the defendant husband. 
The plaintiff also received $10,000.00 war bonds, which the 
two had held. Defendant, in addition, received a $41,600.00 
from a contract which he held, paid up life insurance on 
his life, a $10,000.00 retirement annuity, plus all of his min-
ing interests, for a total of about $53,000.00 in cash and 
$10,000.00 in annuity contracts. The Court stated on page 
745: 
"In determining generally what a wife is entitled to 
when a divorce decree has been granted to the bus-
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band, we have considered one-third as being a fair pro-
portion. This is a relative amount which must come, 
of course, of necessity, vary with the facts of the par-
ticular case." 
In applying this rule, the Supreme Court modified the 
decree to provide that the sums paid should not be in lieu 
of all alimony and that no alimony should be paid unless 
defendant should favorably improve his financial standing. 
In the case of Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 
P2d 364, in 1932, the Court gave the family home to the 
plaintiff wife ~tating that award of property valued at $3,-
500.00 or $4,000.00, even though it be one-half in value of 
all of the husband's property, it seems little enough to give 
in compensation for the loss which this wife has sustained 
by reason of the husband's wrongs. 
In the case of Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 55 P 84, 
the Court allowed a division of the property granting one-
third to the wife, stating that this is equivalent to dissolu-
tion of the marriage by death where the common law gave 
the widow one-third of the estate. 
In the action of Anderson v. Cercone, 54 Utah 339, 180 
Pac 586, 1919, the property in question was paid for by the 
husband's earnings while the wife contributed sernces in 
the looking after the house and children. The Court stated 
on page 349: 
"Property purchased from the joint earnings from hus-
band and wife as above described, belonged to the hus-
band, ~bject only to such interest as the law gives her 
in the property of her husband. In other words, her 
rights in suoh property are neither more OT less than 
they would be if the husband had bought the prope·rty 
with proceeds derived from his separate estate". 
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In the case of Stewart v. Stewart, 66 Utah 366, 242 
Pac 947, 1926, the plaintiff husband sought and obtained a 
divorce from the defendant wife. During the marriage 
the plaintiff purchased the dwelling house out of his own 
wages while the defendant contributed the furniture from 
the house from a rooming house which she had rented 
This furniture was of the value of less than $850.00, while 
the house was worth po~ibly more than $1,250.00. The 
Court stated that the defendant had probably contributed 
to the house payments by her own earnings which defrayed 
the ~penses of the household, and while the plaintiff may 
have contributed some expense money for the household, 
he had taken full u.se and advantage of the defendant's 
property dW'ing the period of the marriage. Therefore, 
the court awarded the real property to each of them as 
tenants in common and awarded the used home fW"Dishings 
to the defendant. 
In Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P'2nd 252, 
1943, the marriage between the older plaintiff, age 66, and 
the wife lasted five days and was terminated by the fault 
of the wife. In this case the court makes it clear that the 
basis for property settlement and alimony is not the .prqr ·. 
erty concept of dower at common law, but rather is based 
upon the following equitable situations as found in the qU<> 
tation of the court: 
"She is in no different position, neither better nor worse 
off, than before the marriage, unless she be wiser for 
the experience. . . . . The basis and reason for 
allowing alimoo.y to the wife is to repay her for the 
years spent in caring for the household, and helping 
the husband in building up his property, and to enable 
her to live, after the support of the husband is taken 
12 
away from her; or in certain Ca$€S to recompense her 
as far as material recompence will do so for injuries 
or abuse to her person or impairment of health brought 
on by conduct or cruelty of the husband during cover-
ture." 
In the case of Johnson vs. Johnson, 107 Utah 147, 152 
?2nd 426, 1944, the defendant husband had diabetes and 
was unable to work. The parties had been supported on 
the relief rolls for much of their married life and it ap-
peared that the plaintiff wife had paid at least part of the 
payments on the mortgaged home out of her own money. 
There was no award of alimony in the c~ for either the 
wife or the children and the court, in making a division of 
property decreed that the wife should take the family 
dwelling subject to the mortgage, while the husband would 
take 1/5 interest which he owned in a dry farm. Neither 
the value of the dwelling or its equity, nor the value of the 
1/5 interest of the farm appeared in the record. In addi-
tion to the real property division, the wife was given one 
half of the interest in an insurance policy on the husband's 
life. The wife's portion being intended to provide the wife 
and children with some measure of security where they 
had no indication of any possible income. 
In the case of Tremayne vs. Tremayne, 210 P2nd 452 
( 1949) the court found the wife had worked her entire 
married life and had supported the husband while he con-
tinued his education and increased his earning power sub-
stantially. The court found that the wife was in substan· 
tially no better earning position than at the start of the 
marriage. The court also found 
"Without her working, the bulk of the property which 
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they have would not have been accwnulated, and he 
probably could not have accumulated it had he been 
single and had he followed the same course which he 
did." 
During the period of coverture the couple accumulated 
property in the value of $2,057.00. Of this amount, the 
court awarded the wife $1,651.00 or 4/5 of the property, 
and awarded him $406.00. 
In the case of Lundgreen vs. LUDdgreell, 112 Utah 31, 
184 P2nd 670, 1947, the dispute revolves around the cfis.. 
tribution of the home of the parties. The evidence indi· 
cated that the plaintiff husband paid the original purchase 
price on the home, but the wife used some of her funds 
for the remodelling of the house and did considerable work 
in improving it, although she also did the housekeeping for 
it for a period of four years. The Supreme Court, there-
fore, divided the property by determining the value of the 
real estate and allowing the plaintiff his original purchase 
price and 11z the excess in value of the market price. nie 
defendant was awarded one-half of the market value In 
excess of the origlnal purchase price. As a fincJ note, 
both of the parties were past 70 years of age and were liY:. 
ing off their old age assistance. 
In addition to the above cited authority, the plaintiff 
is now in a position of having another husband to care for 
her and has no need for the financial security of this prop-
erty. She lives in Payson, and affirmatively states she 
intends to sell the property. Thus, there are no serious 
factors which would require other a division as provided 
for in Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 55 Pac. 84, where the 
court allowed a division of the property, granting 1/3 to 
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the wife, stating that this is equivalent to dissolution of 
the marriage by death where the common law gave the 
widow 1/3 of the estate. There are no factors which would 
seem to take the rule out of this case and it would appear 
that this is still good law today. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant-appellant respectfully urges the Court 
to set aside the trial court's order denying the defendant's 
petition to divide and partition the interest in the family 
home and to remand the case to the lower court with in-
structions to make a division and partition of the interest 
in the family home. The defendant-appellant respectfully 
contends: (1) That the Divorce Decree is~med in 1949, both 
in word and intent, provides that the plaintiff shall have 
the occupancy and use only of the home in question and 
that the defendant shall retain an interest therein, and (2) 
that the petition of the defendant made to the Court for 
a division and partition of the interest in the family home 
was meritorious, reasonable, and in accord with the Law 
in the State of Utah, and warranted a favorable ruling by 
the Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
JACKSON B. HOW.l\RD 
Attorney for Appellant 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
